

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY USSR

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT Interpretation of New Soviet Party and Government Organization and Policies

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1. [REDACTED] sees G.M. Malenkov and L.P. Beriia in the leading positions in the Soviet hierarchy, forming a triumvirate with N.S. Khrushchev. V.M. Molotov and the military clique have lost the power struggle which lasted from October 1952 to 15 March 1953.
2. A comparison of Soviet foreign policy prior to 15 March with policy after that date reveals the contradictions that existed. Compare the air incidents (U.S. of 10 March and British of 12 March), together with General V.I. Chuikov's violent protest, with the invitation to the British to meet in Berlin for discussions (19 March). Compare the A.Ya. Vyshinskiy speech on the Indian proposal in the UN (December 1952) with the current Soviet-Chinese peace feelers (beginning 20 March). Note the replacement of A.S. Panyushkin, Ambassador to the Chinese People's Republic, by Vasilii V. Kuznetsov, a Malenkov man and a non-diplomat (9 March), and the elevation of Ya.A. Malik (6 March, to First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR along with Vyshinskiy), who is a less provocative type, i.e., Berlin blockade talks and opening of Korean talks.
3. Confusion existed internally as well; this has now been resolved. The following are evidences of this confusion: Marshal L.A. Govorov's appointment to the Central Committee of the Communist Party 12 days after the 19th Party Congress; the fact that neither Stalin, Malenkov, nor Beriia commented on the purges; the postponement of the meeting of the Supreme Soviet from 14 to 15 March. ² [REDACTED] this confusion is that Stalin tried to mediate between the Malenkov and Molotov factions. The purges were directed by the military clique. Compare the recent

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purges with those of 1936-38, when Stalin and Molotov, the actual instigators, were the ostensible targets.

4. With the Malenkov accession, the Presidium was made smaller, the purges ended, an amnesty was granted, Marshal G.K. Zhukov was resurrected, Molotov was somewhat demoted, Vyshinskiy was demoted more so, and Khrushchev was appointed as a compromise. Also, four of the eleven Presidium members who were dropped, namely, M.A. Suslov, V.M. Andrianov, N.A. Mikhailov, and V.V. Kuznetsov, had close foreign affairs connections, whereas only one person with similar background was raised to the Presidium, and he is an Azerbaydzhaní and a friend of Malenkov (M.D.A. Bagirov). 4
5. Foreign policy differences were expressed by Malenkov and Molotov at Stalin's funeral. The former spoke of peaceful coexistence with all nations, while the latter spoke of vigilance against imperialistic enemies. At the meeting of the Supreme Soviet (15 March), Malenkov reiterated his stand and his speech was published in the Cominform journal, whereas Molotov's speech was omitted. Thus, between 9 and 15 March, the differences were eliminated.
6. [] the following predictions: Malenkov and his colleagues will do their utmost to ease the tension with the West where possible, will attempt to consolidate Soviet gains internally and in the Satellites, and will not make provocative moves toward the West. Internally, the purges will be discontinued, with the possible exception of economic bureaucrats; the vigilance campaign will be cancelled; and the development of agriculture will be pursued. This period will last three to four years, until the internal situation is bettered and the cadre is improved.

25X1A 1. [] Comment: Information in parentheses was added [] 25X1A

25X1 2. [] Comment: [] neglected to mention that the meeting of the Supreme Soviet was originally announced for 17 March, then changed to 14 March, and postponed to 15 March. 25X1A 25X1

25X1A 3. [] Comment: In the preliminary dissemination of this report ([]), Andreyev was erroneously listed here instead of Andrianov. []

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25X1A 4. [] Comment: Crediting Kuznetsov's appointment as Ambassador to China to the fact that he is a Malenkov man (para. 2) seems to be inconsistent with blaming his dismissal from the Presidium on the fact that he had foreign affairs (i.e., Molotov) connections (para. 4).

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